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1. Introduction
It is obvious that the transition of former socialist economies to market economies calls for tax re-
form. According to Gandhi and Mihaljek (1992/1995) the need for tax reform arises for, at least,
three reasons.
First, there is the incompatibility of a socialist tax system with a market-oriented economy. For in-
stance, in most socialist economies commodity prices are fixed by government, and taxes cannot be
moved forward or backward. Turnover taxes then take the shape of retail-wholesale price differen-
tials, resulting in many different turnover tax rates.  In a market economy, where producers and
retailers are free to set their prices, complex multi-rate tax systems based on wholesale-retail price
differentials are no longer feasible. A uniform sales tax based on the retail price is more functional.
Secondly, changes in the economic structure of a country can only be brought about by different
types of economic reform, such as financial sector reform, the creation of factor markets, external
sector reform, and price reform. Tax reform can facilitate as well as complement these reforms.
Thirdly, macro-economic stability requires sufficient government revenues. In former days the main
government revenue source were profit remittances by state-owned enterprises. Privatisation pro-
grams have transferred ownership of these enterprises to the private sector, resulting in a major loss
of revenue and in the need to introduce new taxes on corporate income.
Over the last years most former socialist countries have implemented major fiscal reforms, of which
3tax reforms are a part1. Corporate income taxes have been introduced, value-added taxes (VATs)
have replaced complex turnover taxes, and systems of personal income tax have been developed
(IMF, 1998, p. 105). For most countries market-directed tax reform suffices, for some countries,
that are about to enter the European Union (EU), fine-tuning is required. As a rule new members of
the EU are obliged to adopt in full the so called acquis communautaire (the standing legislation,
rules, instructions and understandings). This ‘classical Community method of enlargement’ does not
allow for permanent opt-outs, and does not call the acquis as such into question2. An important part
of the acquis communautaire consists of the results of tax harmonisation efforts, mainly in the field
of indirect taxes. The countries that established the European Community (EC) have opted for a
uniform general sales tax which takes the form of a VAT; countries that later on joined the EC were
compelled to adopt the same system. In recent years tax harmonisation efforts in the EU have been
directed at other indirect taxes as well, especially at various excises; up to now direct taxation has
hardly been the subject of tax harmonisation. The harmonisation of indirect taxation is justified in-
variably by the requirements of a single market (in casu the unrestricted movement of goods and
services), and by the opportunity uniform national indirect taxes offer for ‘piggy-backing’ by supra-
national government (part of the national VAT-revenues are earmarked as ‘own resources’ of the
EU and are transferred to Brussels).
In recent years doubts have been cast on the validity of the concept of far-reaching tax harmonisa-
tion. First, the advisability of the ultimate objective of tax harmonisation, the uniformity of national
tax systems, has been criticised. Such uniformity is not strictly needed for the functioning of the Single
European Market (SEM); it can even be harmful if member states impose inequitable and distortion-
ary taxes on one another. Secondly, even íf uniformity is desirable, it is argued that it can be brought
about more efficiently by tax competition between member states than by tax harmonisation out of
                                                
1 See Kuligin (1998) for a brief survey of the changes that took place over the last decade in the tax structures in
seven countries of Central and Eastern Europe (including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). See Véghelyi
(1997) for an overview of trends in tax reforms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. See
Casanegra de Jantscher, Silvani en Vehorn (1992/1995), and IMF (1998, p. 106) for the features of national tax
administrations and the modifications that have been made in relation to transition.
4Brussels. However, tax competition can be harmful as well, as has been argued very recently by the
OECD (1998a). There is a case then for tax diversity, and for tax co-ordination within the EU, al-
lowing member states maximum flexibility in arranging their tax systems, without interfering with the
functioning of the SEM3. ‘Improved co-ordination of tax policies’ has become the magic formula in
Brussels as well, witness the tax package the EU-Ministers of Finance unanimously agreed upon in
December 1997, which aims at limiting the erosion of tax revenues, at contributing to reverse the
trend of increasing taxation of labour, and at eliminating distortions in the Single Market.
This paper addresses the relevance of the next enlargement of the EU4 to the issue of tax co-
ordination. The paper will be structured as follows.
First, in section two, we will discuss the concept of fiscal externalities, focusing on tax externalities
(in a single market). A number of different tax externalities will be discussed, like externalities result-
ing from tax exporting, from tax (base) sharing, from international tax crediting, from the use of taxes
as tariffs, and from tax competition. Next, in section three, an overview is given of the way these
externalities are tackled in the EU. In section four we will discuss the implications the coming en-
largement of the EU has for the issue of tax co-ordination, by comparing various features of the tax
systems of future EU-members with characteristics of the tax systems of incumbent EU member
states. Section six finally, contains some conclusions.
2. Tax externalities in a single market
Recently the well-known concept of spill-overs has been expanded to the concept of ‘interjurisdic-
tional fiscal externalities’. Interjurisdictional fiscal externalities occur when a government’s tax and
                                                                                                                                                        
2 See Preston (1995) for a critical analysis of this method.
3 Amongst others: Cnossen (1990).
4 Following the European Commission in Agenda 2000: with the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia,
Estonia en Cyprus. In this paper we will set aside Cyprus, because this country is not in a process of transition,
and therefore not relevant to the theme of the conference.
5expenditure decisions affect the well-being of taxpayers in other jurisdictions either directly by
changing their consumer or producer prices or their public good provisions, or indirectly by altering
the tax revenues or expenditures of other governments (Dahlby, 1996, p. 398). Direct externalities
thus affect the utility functions of non-residents; indirect externalities affect the budget constraints of
other governments. Moreover, fiscal externalities can be vertical (when a lower-level government
and a higher-level government are involved) or horizontal (when governments on the same level are
involved). Vertical externalities are always indirect5; horizontal externalities are either direct or indi-
rect. Another distinction is that between tax externalities and expenditure externalities, depending
on the kind of decision the externality stems from6. Yet another distinction is the familiar one between
positive and negative externalities. Below, in table 1, we give some examples of different sorts of
fiscal externalities. A and B stand for two local (or national) governments, C for the central (or su-
pranational) government.
Table 1 Fiscal externalities7
Externality Positive Negative
Horizontal direct tax
externality
A lowers the rates of its local beer excise,
of which visitors from B profit as well
B introduces a tourist tax for non-residents
Horizontal indirect tax
externality
B abolishes the property tax for small
companies; formerly unemployed resi-
dents from A get a new job; A can cut
back on social services
A lowers the rates of its local beer excise; the
turnover in B falls, as do the excise revenues
Vertical indirect tax
externality
C introduces an exemption in the motor
vehicle tax for all government vehicles
B increases the rate of  a ‘piggy backed’ tax (a
tax jointly raised by B and C); due to the sub-
sequent increase in tax evasion C gets less tax
revenues
Horizontal direct
expenditure externality
Anti-pollution policy by A Subsidising by B of an outdoor heavy metal
concert in B, that can be ‘enjoyed’ in A as well
                                                
5 Direct vertical externalities would involve the same set of residents.
6 For the indirect fiscal externalities we could make a further distinction between (tax or expenditure) externalities
on taxation and (tax or expenditure) externalities on expenditure.
7 It is worth noting that the same decision can cause a direct as well as an indirect externality, or can have a
vertical ánd a horizontal effect.
6Horizontal indirect
expenditure external i ty
Building by A of a regional training centre
for police officers
Introducing extra bonuses for scarce specialisms
in the civil service, by A
Vertical indirect
expenditure externality
Subsidising by C of the building of private
houses, resulting in higher property tax
revenues for A and B
Training of local civil servants by A and B to
make optimum use of the subsidies of C
Tax externalities can distort fiscal decisions if the perceived marginal cost of public funds (i.e. the
economic cost to taxpayers of raising an additional dollar of tax revenue) deviates from the social
marginal cost of public funds (SMCF) which takes into account the effect of a tax change on all tax-
payers and on all governments’ budget constraints (Dahlby, 1996, p. 398/399). Different taxes8 offer
different possibilities for externalities to arise, as is shown in table 2.
Table 2 Tax externalities
Kind of taxes Keyword Kind of tax externality
Exclusive taxes Tax exporting
‘Taxiffs’
Horizontal direct externality
Horizontal direct externality
Shared taxes Tax base sharing Vertical externality
Linked taxes Tax crediting Horizontal indirect externality
Vertical externality
Competing taxes Tax competition Horizontal indirect externality
Below we will discuss these externalities in more detail, as well as the remedies that are available to
prevent or internalise them. With prevention of tax externalities, these externalities do not occur; with
internalisation of externalities they do take place, but the distorting effects on fiscal decisions are
countered. Horizontal tax externalities can be prevented or internalised horizontally as well as verti-
cally; vertical externalities can only be prevented and internalised vertically.
Tax exporting
When government A has the exclusive right to tax an economic activity or income source, it can
7choose to shift the burden of that tax to residents of jurisdiction B (tax exporting), resulting in an un-
derestimation of the SMCF, and an oversupply of public services in the tax-exporting jurisdiction.
In a way, tax exporting governments exploit monopoly advantages via taxation. Because of the
mainly local character of the monopoly advantages at hand, tax exporting is sometimes considered to
be hardly relevant internationally (Smith, 1996, p. 287). This view may hold for tax exporting in the
case of tourist attractions and the like. However, tax exporting is not only about exploiting, via taxa-
tion, monopoly advantages; it has to do with the monopoly to tax. As a principle of international
taxation, each country has the basic monopoly to tax all economic activities within its own borders. If
a country, in assessing its personal income tax, places a higher tax burden on foreign taxpayers than
on domestic taxpayers, tax exporting occurs. If the property tax on houses owned by foreigners is
higher than the property tax on houses owned by residents, tax exporting takes place as well.
Tax exports and tax imports arise simultaneously. For welfare considerations, only the difference
between the tax exports and imports is relevant (net tax export effects; Fehr, Rosenberg, and Wie-
grad, 1993, p. 13). Overall, tax exporting and importing is a zero-sum game, consisting of income
transfers from one jurisdiction to another.
As far as tax exporting is concerned, there are two basic remedies:
· prevention of tax exporting by bi- or multilateral agreement. Most tax treaties provide for non-
discriminatory taxation by the concluding countries;
· internalisation by transfers offsetting the net tax export effects. These transfers can be horizontal
(i.e. intergovernmental) as well as vertical (in which case supranational government gives matching
grants to lower-level governments with negative tax export effects, and prunes away positive tax
export effects).
‘Taxiffs’
When a government has the exclusive right to tax the import, trade and export of goods and services
within its borders, trade barriers can be set up when using these (indirect) tax structures to discrimi-
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8nate between domestic and foreign goods and services. Import duties are an obvious example of
‘taxiffs’. Differentiation of VAT-structures and rates, and of excise taxes, can also be used to ap-
proximate the mechanism of protection by tariffs.
‘Taxiffs’ are paid by residents; exported taxes, that were discussed above, are paid by non-
residents. The costs of using ‘taxiffs’ are borne by foreign producers, the benefits accrue to domestic
producers, resulting in an underestimation of the SCMF, and an oversupply of public services.
‘Taxiffs’ can be prevented by tax harmonisation; internalisation of these effects can take the form of
compensating grants in case harmonisation rules are not fully met (fines).
Tax sharing
With shared taxes an activity or income source is taxed by one or more local or national govern-
ments (A and/or B) and by central or supranational government C (joint taxation, or tax base
sharing). If one government raises its tax rate, by and large the overall amount of taxable activities or
goods will fall, resulting in a revenue loss for the other government (that does not change its tax rate).
Generally, governments will underestimate the SCMF of raising revenue from shared tax bases, re-
sulting in an oversupply of public services.
A revenue matching grant between the governments involved, equal to the revenue loss of the pas-
sive government, would internalise this externality (Dahlby, 1996, p. 406).
Tax crediting
With linked taxes, the base of a tax levied by one government is statutorily linked with a tax levied by
another government. The deductibility of state and local taxes from federal income tax in the USA is
an example of linkage. Tax exemptions or tax credits in order to bring relief from double taxation are
another. Linked taxes can give rise to vertical and/or horizontal externalities. In most cases, a gov-
ernment that increases a linked tax, will not take into account the resulting loss of revenue for other
governments. As with shared taxes, linked taxes give cause for underestimation of the SMCF, and
for oversupply of public services, and as with tax sharing, matching grants can be used to internalise
9this externality.
Tax competition
With competing taxes, a common activity or income source is used for taxation by competing gov-
ernments on the same level (A and B). If these tax bases are mobile between A and B tax
competition can occur, resulting in cross border shopping, re-allocation of firms, capital flight, labour
migration, etcetera. Tax competition leads to a downward pressure on tax rates, and to an overesti-
mation of the SCMF (additional revenue raised in B as a result of tax increases in A is disregarded).
This in turn leads to an inadequate supply of public services. To offset this distortion a revenue
matching grant can be used equal to the additional revenue that accrues to the other states when one
state raises an additional dollar of tax revenues (Dahlby, 1996, p. 406). Tax competition can be pre-
vented by tax harmonisation.
Tax competition hinges on the movement of tax bases. Taxpayers’ decisions to move tax bases to
other jurisdictions basically depend on three factors:
1.  the nature and magnitude of the fiscal differentials between their own jurisdiction and competing
jurisdictions. Fiscal differentials are the differences as far as the welfare of a taxpayer is con-
cerned, between the ‘package’ of public services and taxes in one jurisdiction, and the
‘packages’ other jurisdictions have on offer. The more positive these fiscal differentials are, the
more likely the movement of tax bases is. Tax rate differentials are at best proxies for tax differ-
entials (due to differences in base definition, assessment, and enforcement of tax laws); tax
differentials, in turn, are at best proxies for fiscal differentials. Tax harmonisation reduces tax dif-
ferentials;
2.  the mobility of the tax base in question (or: the costs of movement of tax bases as such). Capital is
very mobile, property is not. Mobility has to do with physical characteristics of the tax base, as
well as with the extent to which the relevant market is integrated9;
3.  supplementary costs and benefits as a result of the movement of tax bases (for instance the side-
                                                
9 See Musgrave (1990), Van Rompuy, Abraham and Heremans (1991), and Smith (1996) for a more detailed
discussion of the mobility of various tax bases.
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effects of changing residence, in terms of more costly visits to relatives).
Much attention has been given in the literature to tax competition. Below, we will focus on two dif-
ferent relevant aspects:
· the tax competition game;
· tax competition, equity, and Leviathan.
The tax competition game
The decision for a country to engage in tax competition can be considered to be a prisoners’ di-
lemma game, as is shown in table 3.
Table 3 Tax competition as a prisoners’ dilemma10
Country 1/country 2 Engage in tax competition Not engage in tax competition
Engage in tax competition (3,3) (4,1)
Not engage in tax competition (1,4) (2,2)
Obviously, the Nash-equilibrium is (3,3) with both countries engaging in tax competition.
Kanbur and Keen (1993)11, focusing on cross-border shopping, offer more insight in the tax compe-
tition game. When unrestricted tax competition takes place between a small and a large country (with
size being a matter of the number of residents), and each country behaves in the Nash manner (i.e.
chooses its own tax rate to maximise its tax revenue while taking as given the tax rate set by the
other, bearing in mind the impact on cross-border shopping), in equilibrium the small country under-
cuts the large country. I.e., the small country’s tax rate t is below the large country’s tax rate T (t<T).
Compared to the situation in which tax competition is restricted (by closed borders) joint tax revenue
is reduced, with the larger country always suffering a revenue loss; if the difference in size is suffi-
                                                
10 In table 3 (x,y) denotes the (ordinal) utility country 1, respectively country 2, derives from the situation in ques-
tion (with 1=low, 4=high).
11 See Schwidrowski and Wahl (1991) for similar research (with similar findings), focusing on the effect on
governments’ discretionary budgets of a clearing house system, of a shift from the destination to the origin
principle, of harmonization of tax bases, and of centralization of the power to tax.
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ciently great, the smaller country may gain revenue12.
Setting a uniform rate somewhere between t and T always harms the small country (relative to the
Nash-equilibrium). It is beneficial to the large country (again: relative to the situation with unrestricted
tax competition) if harmonisation takes place at rate T; it is harmful to the large country if harmonisa-
tion takes place at t.
Setting a minimum tax rate (also somewhere between the noncooperative rates) would lead to the
small country setting that minimum rate, still undercutting the large country. Compared with the out-
come under unrestricted tax competition both countries set higher tax rates; revenue will certainly
increase in the large country, as will revenue in the small country.
Clearly, tax competition is inefficient, but what method of co-ordination is optimal? Kanbur and
Keen (1993, p. 888/889) offer two criteria of optimality:
· Pareto-efficiency: maximising the revenue of some country conditional on securing some given
level of revenue for the other. Relative to the uncooperative situation, setting a minimum tax rate
satisfies this criterion;
· joint revenue maximisation.
Another criterion would be an increase of joint revenue, making possible compensating transfers
between the revenue-losing country and the revenue-gaining country (the Hicks/Kaldor-variant).
Obviously, the problem with any of these criteria is the choice of the status quo: closed borders or
unrestricted tax competition.
Tax competition, equity, and Leviathan
Fiscal differentials between two countries are often, wrongfully, depicted as characteristics of coun-
tries. They are attributes of individual taxpayers, however. Between two countries there are as many
different fiscal differentials as there are taxpayers. As was put forward above, fiscal differentials are
                                                
12 Cnossen (1990, p. 476) argues that with cross-border shopping the potential revenue loss may be particularly
injurious to smaller countries. While large member states can choose their tax rate largely independently of the
rate in other member states, because their geographical size minimizes the revenue loss associated with cross-
border shopping, small member states are rate takers: as a rule, the cannot impose higher rates than adjacent large
states. On the other hand, small member states might make a virtue of necessity by following a low rate/high sales
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the differences in individual welfare arising from different ‘packages’ of public services and taxes. In
other words: relevant to the individual taxpayer are the bundle of public services accruing to him in
each jurisdiction, and the fiscal residuals involved. These fiscal residuals are the balance of public
services rendered, and taxes paid.
Four different situations can be distinguished:
a.  both jurisdictions offer identical public services to the individual taxpayer, who is facing identical
fiscal residuals. In this case, no movement will take place;
b.  the jurisdictions offer different public services; the fiscal residuals, however, are identical. Move-
ment of tax bases (especially residence mobility) is efficient: taxpayers move to those jurisdictions
that offer public services that are more to their taste;
c.  both jurisdictions offer identical public services, but the fiscal residuals differ, in which case
movement of tax bases is induced only by tax differentials;
d.  the jurisdictions offer different public services, and fiscal residuals differ. This possibility obviously
is much closer to reality than the last three.
In the situation in which identical services are offered and fiscal residuals diverge (situation c), but
also if both services and fiscal residuals differ (situation d), it is important to see what exactly is the
cause for tax differentials:
· it may be more costly to produce the public services in one jurisdiction than in another for well-
founded reasons (comparative disadvantages);
· it may be more costly as a result of inefficiency due to the behaviour of bureaucrats and politi-
cians;
· tax differentials can be the result of differences in systems of taxation.
The second and third ground need some elaboration.
For all individual taxpayers in a jurisdiction, fiscal residuals are zero if a perfect system of benefit
taxation is used. Strict benefit taxation is highly impracticable, however, because of the (non-
exclusive) nature of public goods. Moreover, distributional considerations must also be accounted
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for (Musgrave, 1990, p. 291). Finally, administrative efficiency may call for departures from strict
benefit taxation. Thus, in reality fiscal residuals will generally not be equal to zero. Especially the use
of taxation for redistribution results in taxpayers with negative fiscal residuals (often: the rich) and
taxpayers with positive fiscal residuals (often: the poor). If the former consider their negative residu-
als to be an incentive for mobility (of their capital, or of themselves), impoverishment awaits the
taxpayers that are left behind.
This problem can be also be addressed using the elasticity of tax bases. A basic rule in taxation is
that the more elastic a tax base is, the lower the tax rate should be (the Ramsey-rule). According to
Sinn tax competition will result in a situation in which those who perform highly elastic activities will
be handled with kid gloves, i.e. the mobile part of the labour force, capital-owners, and -generally-
consumers. The ‘losers’ are immobile workers and landowners, who “will serve as lenders of last re-
sort to [...] impoverished governments” (Sinn, 1990, p. 501), and the poor, who rely on a large
government sector. In sum: tax competition can be at right angles with the distribution branch of the
budget, either by free-riding by the mobile and affluent (as with capital-flight), or by shirking the dis-
tribution issue altogether (as with residence mobility). One may argue that tax competition brings
about jurisdictions with more homogeneous preferences, which is efficiency-enhancing. But what use
are homogeneous preferences on redistribution if there is hardly any wealth left to redistribute?
On the other hand, tax competition can have beneficial effects indeed. Tax exporting, the use of
‘taxiffs’, tax crediting, and tax sharing, all lead to a possible overestimation of the SMCF, and an
oversupply of public services. Tax competition, on the other hand, leads to an undersupply of public
services. This characteristic could give cause to advocate tax competition in order to counter the
overexpansion of the public sector resulting from other tax externalities. In addition, tax competition
can counter overexpansion of the public sector resulting from the pursuit of their own interests by
bureaucrats and politicians. Tax competition could possibly limit Leviathan’s tendency to tax and
spend excessively. The premise here is that fiscal preferences of citizens/taxpayers are not correctly
transformed in the political process, and tax differentials reflect bureaucratic and political inefficien-
cies. Voting-with-the-feet then promotes economic efficiency, and tax competition has a wholesome
14
effect.
Above, the use of revenue matching grants was mentioned as a means of internalisation of various tax
externalities, ensuring that the government from whose tax decisions the externalities stem, uses the
proper SMCF. However, these matching grants will not, in general, ensure that the SMCF is the
same for all governments involved (Dahlby, 1996, p. 407). Point by point, the prevention and/or in-
ternalisation of tax externalities has to13:
a.  secure an adequate provision of public services, by foreclosing free riding and shirking by the
affluent and mobile;
b.  provide for a fair distribution of tax burden among residents of each jurisdiction (interpersonal
distribution), as well as a fair distribution of shared tax bases, and credited taxes, and revenues
therefrom, among jurisdictions (intergovernmental distribution14);
c.  leave competition unaffected, that is let taxes be (locally) neutral as far as the allocation of re-
sources in the private sector is concerned;
d.  while permitting a diversity of fiscal structures consistent with taxpayers’ preferences, for the
system of taxation that be used, but also for the expenditures made possible by taxation.
Tax uniformity is not the solution here, if only because full harmonisation harms countries whose
most-preferred tax policy is far away from the uniform policy. Obviously, as Musgrave (1990, p. 37)
points out, the solution is not met by the forces of tax competition either, but requires a complex
pattern of co-ordination. In the next section we will turn to the actual system of co-ordination that
has been set up within the EU.
3. Tax co-ordination in the EU
Two major economic institutions have been established by the countries co-operating in the EU: the
Single European Market (SEM), and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In most textbooks
                                                
13 Paraphrasing and supplementing Musgrave (1990, p. 290).
14 Called tax base entitlement rules, reflecting each member state’s fair share in the total pie, by Cnossen (1996).
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on international economics a common market and a monetary union are treated as highly different
stages in the process of economic integration (Balassa). From the point of view of tax externalities
the SEM is an internal market with, in principle, free movement of capital, labour, consumers, goods,
and services. The EMU, with its fully integrated capital market, adds to the mobility of capital by the
reduction of transaction costs. The EMU thus increases the opportunities for tax competition and its
possible distortionary effects. Moreover, the loss of monetary instruments for EMU-members as a
result of monetary union, may be relevant to the issue of tax externalities. The weight on tax (and ex-
penditure) policies for short-term stabilisation15 and long-term structural adjustments in individual
member states can be expected to increase (Cnossen, 1987, p. 5), giving rise to extensive tax com-
petition, and tempting member states into the use of ‘taxiffs’. This points in the direction of additional
harmonisation. However, participating in the EMU already puts considerable restrictions on member
states’ preferences, as well as on the choice of instruments of economic policy. This makes uniform-
ity less and less desirable, especially in a field that is so essential to a society as taxation. In sum, the
impact of the EMU on the issue of tax externalities within the SEM is not unambiguous. Here we will
focus on the SEM, which is a ‘SEM+’ (a single market with increased mobility of capital) for those
EU-members that engage in the EMU.
In this section, we will first give a brief overview of the stance towards tax harmonisation and tax co-
ordination in the EU, from the start of the EC in 1958 up till now. Next, we will focus on the co-
ordination of indirect taxation (including the issue of tax sharing), followed by direct taxation. Subse-
quently, we will set the actual tax co-ordination efforts alongside the different tax externalities that
were discussed in the previous section, and alongside the requirements for tax co-ordination that
were formulated there.
The attitude towards tax harmonisation and tax co-ordination
The SEM, which functions since the start of 1993, was preceded by the European Common Market
(ECM), from which it differs in that there are no internal frontiers in the SEM. Essential to both the
                                                
15 Of course, within the somewhat tight standards as far as the budget deficit is concerned, as laid down in the
Pact for Stability and Growth.
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ECM and the SEM is that competition (between producers) is the mechanism for allocating re-
sources. The possible distortion of competition constitutes the main motive for tax co-ordination in
the EU. The Treaty of Rome assigns to the European Commission the task, in consultation with the
member states, of eliminating distortions in competition. In the early stages of the EC, the European
Commission interpreted this provision as a mandate to pursue more or less complete equalisation of
the various taxes in the member states (Cnossen, 1990, p. 473). A considerable number of reports
and proposals was produced, dealing with indirect taxation as well as with direct taxation. The
Commission’s earlier intentions were effectuated only in the field of commodity taxation, where a
value-added-tax (VAT) was established, with a more or less uniform tax base, and aligned VAT-
rates. As far as taxes on income and profits were concerned, the Commission’s major feats are the
harmonisation of capital duty payable by companies, two directives concerning the taxation of groups
of companies (the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, and the Merger Directive), and the Convention on
the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises16. Otherwise, the Commission hardly made any
headway.
In 1980, in its ‘Report on the scope for convergence of tax systems in the Community’, the Euro-
pean Commission took a very cautious stance, and identified (only) two fundamental objectives of
EU-tax policy: the elimination of frontier controls, and the alignment of company tax burdens. In
1985 the first issue was dealt with in the White Paper on the completion of the internal market, in
which the Commission proposed that border tax adjustments were to be administered on a Commu-
nity-wide basis by mutual recognition of each member state’s tax credits shown on exporters’
invoices, balances being settled through a common clearing system. Moreover, special measures
were proposed for removing frontier controls in respect of the major excises. The proposed VAT-
clearing-house system has not been introduced up till now.
Starting from the late eighties the concept of more or less comprehensive tax harmonisation in the
EC, concentrating on the VAT and excise taxes, was gradually swapped for a concept more in line
with the idea of subsidiarity. The subsidiarity principle states that intervention at the central level
                                                
16 Both Directives and the Convention were adopted by the European Council in July 1990.
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should only take place in the presence of cross-border externalities or economies of scale, which
cannot be properly alleviated by a simple co-ordination between concerned national governments.
Accordingly, priority is now being given to co-ordination and mutual approximation of member
states’ tax systems rather than a to systematic harmonisation imposed at the EU level. The ‘improved
co-ordination of tax policies’ has become the magic formula. This co-ordination is based on the fol-
lowing priorities and guidelines:
a.  limiting fiscal erosion due to excessive tax competition between member states over mobile activi-
ties;
b.  improving the functioning of the single market, by introducing a new common VAT system, and
by submitting new proposals on the taxation of cross-border interest and royalty payments be-
tween associated companies;
c.  promoting employment, by exchanging information between member states on the most effective
tax measures in terms of job creation;
d.  respecting the environment, by setting out guidelines on the use of environmental taxes, and new
proposals on the taxation of energy products.
“The purpose [...] is to tackle harmful tax competition and eliminate some distortions in the Single
Market. Its purpose is not to raise taxes, which would damage the international competitiveness of
the Union, nor is it intended to be the start of a process of wholesale tax harmonisation, which would
be incompatible with the subsidiarity principle”, according to the European Commission17.
Tax co-ordination and indirect taxes
In 1968 internal custom duties were abolished in the EC, and common external tariffs were intro-
duced. Consequently, a VAT was introduced with a largely uniform tax base. A VAT allows for
border tax adjustments based on the destination principle. Suppose a Dutch firm buys a British
product. With border tax adjustments, the British product is ‘detaxed’ upon export; a zero-rate is
applied and the British exporter can reclaim previously paid VAT in the UK. Upon import in Hol-
                                                
17 Press release European Commission, 2-12-1997.
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land, the going VAT-rate is applied, and VAT is paid to the Dutch government, where VAT is also
reclaimed after retail-sale. With border tax adjustments, tax neutrality is provided for, even if VAT-
rates vary between member states.
The Single European Act of 1986 aimed at establishing an internal market (starting in 1993) without
internal frontiers (the SEM), which meant that border tax adjustments could no longer be used.
Commodities that are sold through -taxable- trading channels are not affected by the abolishment of
border tax adjustments; the VAT-tax credit mechanism ensures that every product in each member
state is always taxed at the rate that is levied at the retail stage in that state, regardless of the export-
ing member state’s VAT (Cnossen, 1990, p. 475). However, two problems arise:
· not all trade occurs between firms. At the start of 1993, as a consequence of the completion of
the SEM, the restrictions on the import for personal use of tax-paid goods were lifted, giving rise
to direct consumer purchases in member states with low VAT-rates (cross-border shopping);
· if border tax adjustments are forgone, products are not ‘detaxed’ upon export. Resuming the ex-
ample of a Dutch firm buying British, VAT that is reclaimed in Holland, has in part been paid to
the British government.
The first problem has been addressed in the EU by alignment of the VAT-rates. In the 1987 White
Paper on the SEM a more rigorous use of standard and reduced rates was proposed, with reduced
rates only applicable for foodstuffs and the like. Moreover, ranges were proposed of 14%-20% for
the standard rate, and 4%-9% for the reduced rate. Similar proposals referring to excise taxes were
made.
To solve the second problem the Commission proposed a clearing mechanism to redistribute VAT-
revenues between EU-members, based on the books kept by importing and exporting firms. The EU
could only agree on a transitional arrangement however, in which the status quo largely was retained
(i.e. the destination principle, without the need for clearing arrangements), by a shift of the border tax
adjustment procedure into the books of firms and by a number of special provisions for, for example,
cross-border mail order sales, second-hand commodities, and art and antiques. Under this transi-
tional system ‘importation’ is replaced by ‘acquisition’ as the taxable event, with a general exemption
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in the country of origin, if the acquirer is subject to VAT in another member state.
In 1991 it was decided that each member state should operate one VAT-standard rate and two, but
preferably one, reduced rate(s). Existing zero-rates are tolerated; the introduction of new zero-rates
is not allowed. Minimum VAT-rates were set: 15% for the standard rate, and 5% for the reduced
rate. Further harmonisation of the rates is planned to be proposed in 1999.
In 1996 Commissioner Monti presented proposals for a new VAT, based on the origin principle18. If
these proposals are adopted, the new VAT will use a clearing-arrangement, based on the National
Accounts (and not on the books of firms). The transitional VAT-system, effective as of 1993, will
automatically be extended until the new system comes into force.
Tax sharing in the EU between member states is non-existent. There is some vertical tax-sharing
however in the field of VAT. Contrary to most federations and most unitary states (Boadway and
Keen, 1996), the EU displays a negative fiscal gap: the revenues raised by the higher level of gov-
ernment are not sufficient to cover its expenditures, resulting in the need for upward funding. The only
real EU-levies19 are the customs levies and duties and the levies within the framework of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (including sugar levies). The remainder is provided for by a share in member
states’ VAT-revenues, and by a GNP-based-contribution by member states.
In short, the EU has been given no power to tax, in the sense of exclusive taxes20. One could argue
that the VAT is a tax that is shared in the EU. The share of the EU in a member state’s VAT-
revenues is 1%21 of the harmonised VAT-base in that country. By taking the (harmonised) base as a
basis, one gets around differences in VAT-rates. Effectively there is a EU-VAT with a rate of 1%.
The national VAT-base is relevant however only up to 50% GNP. By using a 50%-GNP-ceiling
countries that rely heavily upon the VAT are spared. Instead of the VAT being a shared tax, its
                                                
18 “A common system of VAT: A programma for the single market”, COM (96) 328 final.
19 We refrain from the use of the term ‘own resources’, that is commonly used to denote all EU-revenues,
including upward funding by member states.
20 As Smith points out one of the arguments in favour of the complete assignment of particular taxes to the EU
would be economies of scale. However, these economies of scale are likely to be of less importance in the EU. The
unit cost savings that arise from a transfer from the national level to the EU are likely to be relatively modest,
since the national units are already large, and differences in language, legal systems, and corporate structures are
likely to reduce sharply the potential for administrative savings from EU-wide tax administration (Smith, 1995, p.
378).
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revenues are shared; the EU (unlike its member states) has no autonomous right to unilaterally
change its VAT-rate.
Direct taxation
Tax harmonisation efforts in the field of direct taxation display a multitude of reports, initiatives,
Commission proposals, proposed Directives, draft Directives, preliminary draft Directives and such,
the bulk of which were withdrawn later on. Apart from a Council Regulation on the application of
social security schemes to individuals who choose to work in another member state, the harmonisa-
tion of direct taxes in the EU has been confined to corporate taxation, more precisely to:
a.  the corporate income tax, and the withholding tax on dividends;
b.  the withholding tax on interest;
c.  the taxation of groups of companies (including taxation of parent-subsidiary dividends).
With company taxation a twofold problem of double taxation arises. First, corporate profits are
taxed as company profits (corporate income tax) as well as as shareholders dividends (personal in-
come tax). Each member state in the EU has dealt with this problem of double taxation differently.
Most countries have some kind of dividend relief system, at the shareholder level (imputation system,
tax credit system, or special personal income tax rate). Secondly, profits that are distributed to for-
eign investors (private investors, or foreign companies) may be taxed in the country where these
profits arise, as well as in the country the investor resides. Basically, company profits in the EU are
taxed according to the origin or source principle. What happens to repatriated profits, is outside the
field of vision of the source state. Even if the source state provides for an identical treatment of do-
mestic and foreign investors, it has no say over the tax treatment of ‘exported profits’.
Combined, these two double-taxation problems have proved to be insurmountable for the EU. Ini-
tially (in 1975) the European Commission aimed at eliminating double taxation on dividends through
a centralised harmonisation of company tax systems. In 1990 these proposals were withdrawn. At
present the company tax systems that are used by EU-member states vary considerably, as do the
                                                                                                                                                        
21 The so-called call-up rate.
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corporate income tax rates22. Imputation is more often than not offered to domestic shareholders
only, which, of course, is discriminatory against foreign shareholders. Company taxes in the EU dis-
criminate between (various kinds of) in-state and out-of-state investors and result in an arbitrary
division of the company income tax base between the state of investment and the state of the investor
(Cnossen, 1996, p. 23). A shift to the residence principle would solve this problem, but would mean
that countries forgo the right to tax income arising within their own territory23. Therefore, the problem
is approached along the lines set out in the 1992 report of the Ruding Committee: aligning company
tax systems, and restricting company tax rates (by setting  a minimum and a maximum rate).
It must be pointed out that substantial co-ordination in this field has already been achieved through
unilateral exemptions and tax credits and bilateral tax treaties (Cnossen, 1987, p. 4). Moreover, the
European Commission has been very prompt in bringing to the European Court of Justice cases of
discriminatory practices against non-resident corporations. Recently, a similar intergovernmental ap-
proach was used in the EU to address the problem of tax competition. On 1 December 1997 the
Ecofin Council agreed on a code of conduct for business taxation, which should prevent the intro-
duction of new fiscal measures that could influence the place of investment, like tax measures which
provide for a significantly lower effective level of taxation (including zero taxation) than those which
generally apply in the member states in question, like granting special advantages only to non-
residents, like providing rules for calculating the profits of multinationals which deviate from OECD-
rules, and like the less strict application of tax regulations by the tax authorities. The Code of Con-
duct provides for a review process to determine which potentially harmful measures are actually
harmful. These measures are required to be rolled back (in principle by 31 December 2002). For
new measures there is a standstill clause: member states will refrain from introducing new harmful
measures.
The problem of withholding taxation on interests and royalties has to do with tax evasion as well
as with tax competition. As far as the taxation of interests and royalties is concerned, the residence
principle applies: interest income is not taxed in the country where it is earned but in and by the in-
                                                
22 For an overview of systems and rates, see Cnossen (1996).
23 See Cnossen (1996, p. 25-27) for a discussion.
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vestor’s country of residence. Each member state however levies a withholding tax on savings in-
come paid to residents of other member states. If that withholding tax is zero-rated ánd the source
country provides adequate information to the tax administration of the country of residence on ex-
ported interests, the system makes investors indifferent between domestic and foreign assets.
Unfortunately, not every member state uses zero-withholding taxes, and there is hardly any exchange
of information between member states. One could argue that without adequate information (and with
the subsequent incentive for tax evasion), any rate for the withholding tax is better than the zero-rate.
This line of reasoning is followed by the Ecofin Council, which has opted for a ‘co-existence’-model:
each member state should either operate a withholding tax (with a minimum effective rate), or pro-
vide information on savings income to other member states. The European Commission has been
requested to bring forward a proposal for a Directive along this lines24.
As far as the taxation of groups of companies (including taxation of parent-subsidiary dividends) is
concerned, two directives are in force and have been implemented as of 1992: the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive and the Merger Directive. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive aims at reducing the differences
between taxation rules for nationally organised groups of companies and taxation rules for EU-wide
groups. It compels the member state of the parent company to either refrain from taxing the profits of
a subsidiary that is resident in another member state, or, if taxing such profits, to authorise the parent
company to deduct from its own tax amount due the corporation tax paid by the subsidiary in the
other member state. Furthermore, exemption from (or zero-rating) withholding tax of profit distribu-
tions (dividends) by the subsidiary to the parent company is provided for. The Merger Directive
provides for the deferral of taxation on capital gains on defined cross-border mergers or reorganisa-
tion within the Community25.
                                                
24 Press release European Commission, 2-12-1997. See Gérard and Hadhri (1994) for a discussion of possible coor-
dinative measures in this field.
25 For the sake of completeness, the Convention on the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises must be
mentioned. This convention, adopted by the European Council in 1990, adresses the problem of double taxation,
which arises when one member state upwardly adjusts the taxable income of an enterprise (because of
transactions that are not valued ‘at arm’s length’), but another member state does not allow a corresponding
decrease of the taxable income of the associated enterprise.
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The EU-method of tackling tax externalities
A complex and diverse pattern of tax co-ordination has developed in the EU, in which four major
coordinating instruments can be made out:
· the use of directives and resolutions for harmonisation (often: equalisation) of taxes;
· the ‘use’ of the Court of Justice to fight discriminatory taxation;
· the use of bilateral agreements, like tax treaties;
· the use of multi-lateral agreements within or without the EU-framework (like codes of conduct,
and OECD-models).
The former two instruments are used especially in the field of indirect taxation; the latter two are
dominant in the field of direct taxation.
Focusing on the tax externalities that were discussed in section two, one could argue that preventing
and opposing the discriminatory use of (mainly indirect) taxation, labelled ‘taxiffs’ above, has been
predominant, in line with the preoccupation within the EC with possible distortions of the SEM, wit-
ness the abolition of internal import duties, and the equalisation of the general and specific sales
taxes.
Tax exporting is an important problem in the field of direct taxation. Tax exporting has to do with
the monopoly to tax. That monopoly has been elegantly apportioned (by border tax adjustments and
similar administrative measures) over source and destination states as far as commodity taxes are
concerned, but it is a recurrent problem in direct taxation. Within the EU, there is no equal treatment
of resident and non-resident taxpayers. The edge of the problem is, fragmentarily, taken off by bilat-
eral agreements, and by rulings of the European Court of Justice. For corporative taxpayers that
reside in more than one member state (parent-subsidiary companies, companies with permanent es-
tablishments, etcetera) solutions have been found at the supranational level, by explicit EU-directives.
Tax competition has become a major issue in the EU recently. A number of instruments are used
here: minimum rates for commodity taxes, alignment of company tax systems and rates, and the code
of conduct on harmful tax competition. Two  notes on the way the EU tries to tackle tax competition
can be made:
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· the imposition of minimum ánd maximum rates within the field of corporate taxation, as suggested
by the Ruding Committee and adopted by the European Commission, is overdone. Tax competi-
tion leads to a loss of revenue to the high-tax government, which should be incentive enough not
to set rates above other member states’. Minimum rates suffice;
· the code of conduct on harmful tax competition does not address tax competition in full. It is
aimed at fighting unwarranted favours to not-yet-resident taxpayers26. Setting a net personal
wealth tax rate (for all residents) below that of the neighbouring state, is a (non-business taxation
example of a) measure that is not affected by the code of conduct.
The problem of double taxation, and its tackling by tax treaties, gives rise to possible externalities
that were discussed in section two under the heading tax crediting. The interesting thing here is that
preventing externalities like tax exporting can cause other tax externalities like tax crediting. The pos-
sible solution of tax exporting problems in indirect taxation by a clearing-house can also be
considered to be a tax crediting problem. One could argue that tax crediting externalities are the
other side of the picture of tax co-ordination as such. As far as tackling tax crediting externalities are
concerned, the subsidiarity principle should be dominant: intervention by the EU is only acceptable if
economies of scale make centralisation the more efficient solution. When the European Commission,
in 1987,  proposed its first version of the clearing-house, member states, with good reason, had their
doubts as to the efficiency of that design.
As with tax crediting tax sharing in the EU can be regarded as being the result of the solution of
other fiscal externalities, and creating tax externalities of its own. Expenditures in the EU can (or
should be) carried back to the alleviation of spill-overs and/or to economies of scale. To cover these
expenditures, inter alia, the mechanism of VAT-revenue-sharing has been brought into being. The
possible externalities arising from tax base sharing are prevented by mechanisms like the call-up-rate,
and the GNP-ceiling. Moreover, the institutional texture of the EU, which is basically intergovern-
mental, makes sure that decisions on the EU-VAT-rate are always co-ordinated.
                                                
26 One could argue that this kind of tax competition is similar to ‘taxiffs’ and tax exporting. While ‘taxiffs’ and tax
exporting harm foreign taxpayers, tax competition favours them.
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Section two was ended with listing four issues with which tax co-ordination has to deal:
1.  an adequate provision of public goods (by foreclosing free riding and shirking);
2.  providing a fair interpersonal distribution of tax burden as well as a fair intergovernmental distribu-
tion of tax bases;
3.  locational tax neutrality;
4.  permitting fiscal diversity.
It is clear that the third goal of tax co-ordination (tax neutrality) has been predominant in the EU, es-
pecially with regard to commodity taxes, by means of EU-directives. The second goal has been dealt
with by member states themselves as far as direct taxation is concerned, by conducting tax treaties.
With indirect taxes the base-distribution-issue has been managed smoothly by the VAT-credit-
mechanism. In the years to come, it will become clear whether or not the EU has a role to play in
that mechanism, by means of a clearing-house. The first goal has only recently become an issue, in
relation to the issue of tax competition. As far as fiscal diversity is concerned (the fourth goal): such
diversity is history in commodity taxation; however (and as a consequence?) the systems of direct
taxation display a considerable variety.
4. The enlargement of the EU and tax co-ordination
Competition is not only the keyword as far as the SEM is concerned, it is central to the EU-strategy
of enlargement as well. Without playing down the importance of enlargement with regard to stable
international relations in Europe, the possible economic profits of enlargement of the EU with Central
and East European Countries (CEECs), which are generally considered to be large27, are put first
(and foremost) by the EU. However, ‘safety first’ is the motto the EU uses in its enlargement strat-
egy. The European Council in Copenhagen (June 1993) agreed on a number of economic and
political criteria that newcomers would need to satisfy in order to accede to the EU. In Essen (De-
cember 1994) the European Council adopted its pre-accession-strategy, which has to do with a
                                                
27 See Baldwin, Francois and Peters (1997) for a detailed analysis.
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range of initiatives to familiarise the EU and the associated countries with one another. In Agenda
2000 the European Commission selected a small group of countries, with which it will engage in ne-
gotiations on accession treaties: the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia en Cyprus.
Until recently accession of these countries was expected to take place in 2002, but at present acces-
sion could well happen on a later date.
The economic criteria of the Copenhagen Summit are:
a.  the existence of a functioning market economy;
b.  the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU;
c.  the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of economic
and monetary union.
The last criterion is the economic version of the criterion of full and unrestricted acceptance of the
acquis communautaire. In this section we will discuss whether the acquis, which has always been
inviolable in EU-enlargement processes, should be modified as far as taxation is concerned, in view
of the coming enlargement of the EU. Put differently: what changes in tax co-ordination within the EU
are recommendable as a result of the enlargement?
In table 4 the share of different taxes as a percentage of GDP is listed for the five countries at hand,
as well as for the incumbent EU-members.
Table 4 Main taxes in the general government revenue structure (% GDP, 1996; EU-15: 1992)
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia EU-15
Total tax revenue (including social security con-
tributions)
39% 36% 36% 40% 45% 41%
· personal income tax   5%   4%   6%   9%   7% 11%
· corporate profit tax   4%   2%   2%   3%   1%   3%
· social security contributions 16%  11%  14%  11%  17% 12%
· VAT/sales tax + excise taxes 12%  13%  15%  15%  20% 13%
· various other taxes   2%    6%    0%    2%    0%   2%
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Based on:
· IMF World Economic Outlook, May 1998, p. 105;
· Revenue statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-1993
Two points stand out. First, the personal income tax is relatively ‘underused’ in the five countries
compared to the EU-15. Secondly, Slovenia relies relatively heavily on general and specific sales
taxes. It is worth mentioning that as from 1999 a new VAT-system will be introduced in Slovenia.
Apart from these two points, the tax structures of the countries at hand are largely similar to the tax
structures of the incumbent EU-members. From the point of view of tax co-ordination this means
that the extent to which the tax co-ordination system has to allow for growing diversity in systems of
taxation of an enlarged EU is limited. The striking similarity between the two groups of countries can
be explained by the considerable tax reform efforts in the former socialist countries that were men-
tioned in the introductory section. Moreover, it is likely that in reforming tax systems these countries
have anticipated substantially on the possibility of accession. It is not clear, however, whether this
anticipation took place wholeheartedly (i.e. in line with existing fiscal preferences) or not.
On the basis of our discussions in section two and three, we can pinpoint a number of features of the
tax structures of future members that may be relevant to the tax co-ordination issue, and that will be
discussed below. First, we discuss indirect taxation:
· the extent to which discriminatory provisions (tax exporting devices) are part of the indirect tax
systems of future members, and the use of indirect taxes as ‘taxiffs’;
· tax (rate) differentials between the VAT structures of future members and the going EU-VAT-
structure;
· the issue of cross-border shopping;
Secondly, we deal with some issues of direct taxation:
· corporate tax systems and the discriminatory use of direct taxation;
· the use of tax crediting.
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Indirect taxation
In table 5 the relevance of sales taxes and excises for the government budget is outlined for the five
countries. Estonia and Slovenia clearly stand out.
Table 5 Sales taxes and excises as % of government budget, in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland,
Slovenia
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia
General sales tax revenues as % total central govern-
ment budget (1995)
22% 42% 21% 25% N/A
Excises as % total central government budget (1995) 13% 11% 10% 15% N/A
Sales taxes and import duties as % total central gov-
ernment budget (1995)
N/A. N/A N/A N/A 70%
Source: Bulletin EU (various supplements 1997)
Using the European Tax Handbook 1998 we have analysed the use of indirect taxation as a means
of exporting the tax burden, in the case of exclusive taxes, as well as the use of taxes as ‘taxiffs’ in
commodity taxation. Going by the information offered in the handbook, such discriminatory practices
do not exist (in indirect taxation) in the Czech Republic, nor in Hungary, nor in Poland. In Estonia a
minor infringement of non-discrimination can be found in the VAT, where subscriptions to domestic
periodicals are zero-rated (subscriptions to foreign periodicals are not). In Slovenia the 5% tax on
international transport stands out. This tax is levied from foreign citizens that perform business trans-
port activities and acquire income in the territory of Slovenia.
Below (table 6) the main characteristics are depicted of the VATs28 in the countries at hand, exclud-
ing Slovenia. In Slovenia presently a single-stage sales tax is used, which is levied at the point of retail
sale. As from 1999, Slovenia will switch to a VAT. Unfortunately, we are not familiar with the main
features of the new Slovenian VAT.
                                                
28 Because of lack of information we will not discuss excise taxation here.
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Table 6 Main characteristics of the VATs in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland
Feature Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland
Year of introduction 1993 1991 1988 1993
Standard rate, re-
duced rate)s, zero-
rate
22%, 5% 18%, 0% 25%, 12%, 0% 22%, 7%; 17%, 0%
Major items re-
duced rate(s)29
Most food products, water
Pharmaceutical products,
aids for the disabled
Thermal energy, electric-
ity, coal, gas
Newspapers, periodicals,
books
New buildings, construc-
tion activities
Recreation, cultural and
sports activities
Transportation
Telecommunications
Funerals
-- Most food products
Pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, aids for the
disabled
Electricity, household
fuel
Newspapers, periodi-
cals, books
Washing, dry-cleaning
Social housing
Hotels, motels, board-
ing houses
Transportation
Funerals
Electricity, fuel (17%)
Food products (7%
Medicines, medical sup-
plies (7%)
Children’s goods (7%)
Building materials, basic
appliances (7%)
Passenger transportation
(7%)
Telecommunications
(7%)
Major items zero
rate (other than ex-
ports)
-- Subscriptions
to periodicals
published and
printed in Es-
tonia
Tickets of
theatres, state
concert halls
Medicines Basic medicines
Newspapers, periodicals,
books
Housing units
Feed, fertiliser, pesticides
Farm machinery and
equipment
Domestic air services
Exemptions (with-
out credit; other
than standard ex-
Medicines Medical serv-
ices, medicines
Funerals
Legal/financial services Semi-processed food-
stuffs, water
Horticultural products
                                                
29 In the new Slovenian VAT the following commosities will fall under the lower rate: foodstuff for human and
animal consumption, pharmaceutical products, medical equipment, newspapers, periodicals, books, and children’s
clothing (Cnossen, 1998, p. 243).
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emptions) Cultural services
Agricultural services
Legal/financial services
R&D activities
Based on: European Tax Handbook 1998, Bulletin EU (various supplements 1997), Cnossen (1998)
The VATs in the countries in question are relatively new. Via the mechanism of anticipation, dis-
cussed above, this probably explains why the VATs are largely congruent with the EU-standard-
VAT. However, following Cnossen (1998), some structural shortcomings can be mentioned:
· the exemption of various essential products is not congruent with EU-standards;
· various other essential products are taxed on reduced rates, in a rather haphazard way;
· the basis of the VATs can be broadened by including more public sector bodies (especially
transportation services) and cultural services.
As far as the level of the VAT-rates is concerned, the rates are consistent with the minimum rates set
by the EU.
How about cross-border shopping in an enlarged EU?
Table 7 offers information that may be relevant to the issue.
Table 7 Size, population, and information on first trading partners for five future EU-members
Area in 1.000
ha (1995)
Population x
1000 (1995)
VAT-rates Bordering on ...
(enlarged EU)
First trading
partner (import
from)
First trading
partner (export
to)
Czech
Republic
7.887 10.321 22, 5 Poland
Austria
Germany
Germany Germany
Estonia 4.523 1.476 18, 0 - Finland Finland
Hungary 9.303 10.212 25, 12, 0 Slovenia
Austria
Germany Germany
31
Poland 31.269 38.609 22, 17, 7, 0 Germany
Czech Republic
Germany Germany
Slovenia 2.025 1.990 N/A Italy
Austria
Hungary
Germany Germany
Germany
(1997)
35.697 82.021 16, 7
Austria (1997) 8.386 8.068 20, 10
Italy (1997) 30.132 57.461 20, 10, 4
Source: Bulletin EU (various supplements 1997), Eurostat On-line statistical indicators, European Tax Handbook 1998
From table 7 it becomes clear that the future members are in danger of losing considerable VAT-
revenue to -especially- Germany, if they maintain the VAT-rates they apply at present, which stands
in contrast to our theoretical reflections, which focused on undercutting by small countries. With Lux-
embourg (15%) and Spain (16%) Germany has the lowest standard-VAT-rate in the EU, and it that
respect it is unfortunate for most future members to be bordering on Germany.
Direct taxation
In section 3 it became clear that ‘patchwork’ may be the best way to describe corporate taxation in
the EU. Will enlargement of the EU change that overall picture? Probably not. Table 8 lists informa-
tion on corporate and personal income taxation.
Table 8 Basic company tax (CT) rate, top personal income tax (PIT) rate, double taxation relief systems (SL: at
the shareholder level; CL: at the company level), net wealth tax (NWT) rate (1998)
Basic CT-
rate30
Top PIT-rate Double taxation relief system Top NWT-rate
Czech Republic 35% 40% Dividend-deduction system (CL) ánd spe-
cial PIT-rate dividends 25% (SL)
None
Estonia 26% 26% Full dividend exemption (SL) None
                                                
30 CT- and PIT-rates include surcharges and local income taxes. Percentages have been rounded to the nearest
integer.
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Hungary 19% 42% Special PIT-rates dividends 20%-35% (SL) None
Poland 36% 40% Special PIT-rate dividends 20% (SL) None
Slovenia 25% 50% PIT-credit (SL) None
Austria 34% 50% Special PIT-rate dividends 25% (SL) Abolished 1994
Belgium 40% 58% Special PIT-rate dividends 15%-25% (SL) None
Denmark 34% 58% Special PIT-rate dividends 25% -40% (SL) Abolished 1997
Finland 28% 55% PIT-credit (SL) 0.9%
France 37% 59% PIT-credit (SL) 1.5%
Germany 43% 59% PIT-credit (SL)31 Abolished 1997
Greece 35% 45% Full dividend exemption (SL) None
Ireland 36% 48% PIT-credit (SL) None
Italy 41% 46% PIT-credit (SL) None
Luxembourg 37% 49% PIT-credit (SL) 0.5%
Netherlands 35% 60% Small general dividend exemption + special
PIT-rate dividends 25% for substantial
interest shareholders (SL)
0.7%
Portugal 44% 40% PIT-credit (SL) None
Spain 35% 56% PIT-credit (SL) 2.5%
Sweden 28% 56% Special PIT-rate dividends 30% (SL) 1.5%
United Kingdom 31% 40% PIT-credit (SL) None
Source: European Tax Handbook 1998
As far as the basic company tax rates of the five countries at hand are concerned, generally these
rates are below EU-level, as are the top personal income tax rates. As with the VAT, it is important
to point out that these tax systems are relatively new. Tax systems gradually become more compli-
cated, by all kinds of exemptions and deductions, thus eroding the tax base, and giving rise to
relatively high tax rates, in order to secure adequate tax revenues. Incumbent EU-members are en-
gaged in reversing this process, by broadening the base and lowering tax rates. It is likely that in
future some conversion of the main direct tax rates will take place.
With regard to the main question (will enlargement perpetuate the present diversity in corporate
                                                
31 In part: split-rate system (at the company level)
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taxation?) the answer is yes. As with the EU-15 there is no uniform system of double dividend relief
in the five acceding countries. As with the EU-15 that brings us to the issue of bilateral solutions via
tax treaties. Table 9 shows the presence of tax treaties between the acceding countries and the in-
cumbent EU-members. It becomes clear that especially Estonia, and to a lesser extent Slovenia,
have not fully exhausted their possibilities of bilateral tax co-ordination.
Table 9 Treaties on dividends and/or interest and/or royalties
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia
Austria x x x
Belgium x x x x
Denmark x x x x x
Finland x x x x x
France x x x x
Germany x x x x
Greece x x x
Ireland x x x
Italy x x x x
Luxembourg x x x
Netherlands x x x x
Portugal x
Spain x x x
Sweden x x x x x
United Kingdom x x x x x
Total # 15 4 14 14 9
Source: European Tax Handbook 1998
Let us have a look at the withholding tax on interest. Table 10 lists the standard withholding tax rates,
as well as the rates provided for in tax treaties with EU-members. We have omitted Slovenia, be-
cause the treatment of interest paid to non-resident individuals in that country is currently unclear.
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Table 10 Withholding tax on interest paid to recipient individual resident abroad
Czech Republic Estonia32 Hungary Poland
Standard rate (without tax treaty) 25% 0% 18% 20%
If agreed upon bilaterally, rate for
most EU-members
0% 0% 0% 0%
Number of treaties with incum-
bent EU-members (out of 15)
15 4 14 14
Number of treaties with other
future members (out of 4)
3 2 2 3
Just as most incumbent EU-members have agreed upon mutually, a 0% withholding tax is applied by
all four countries. It is unclear to what extent the acceding countries provide information to resident
states on outgoing interest.
With company taxation, as well as with the taxation of border-crossing interest, the accession of the
five countries at hand, does not diminish the tax co-ordination problem in the EU. On the contrary:
diversity is added. What implications can that diversity have for the issue of tax competition? As far
as tax competition in corporate taxation is concerned (leading to possible shifts in the location of
forms, and in their pattern of investment) the data presented in this section do not enable us to draw
univocal conclusions. As is shown by Cnossen (1996) the treatment of the returns on equity and on
debt differs between countries, as well as the treatment of corporate and non-corporate investors,
and of resident and non-resident investors. All in all, it is not possible to pinpoint ‘tax havens’ in the
present EU, nor is that possible for the enlarged EU33.
Residence mobility on the other hand, may be a little bit more straightforward. In table 8 we have
listed the top personal income tax rate, and the (top) net wealth tax rate (if such a tax is levied).
Bearing in mind that tax rate differentials are only proxies for tax differentials, let alone for fiscal dif-
ferentials, it is clear that the current trend to abolish net wealth taxes in the EU, has led the acceding
                                                
32 In Estonia the withholding tax on interest is 0% for interest paid by banks and other credit institutions, which
was 10% up til 1-7-1998. For interest paid by other debtors the 10% rate still applies.
33 A major element as far as capital mobility is concerned is of course the fact that the acceding countries do enter
the EU, but not the EMU. Compared to EMU-members, capital mobility to and from the acceding countries will be
relatively restricted.
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countries to refraining from introducing such taxes. This act, combined with the relatively low per-
sonal income tax rates, encourages residence mobility to the acceding countries.
5. Conclusions
The more integrated the EU is, the harder it is to meet the requirements of taking on the acquis,
compared with previous accessions. Often, the transition of socialist economies to market-oriented
economies is put forward as an element that further complicates meeting the requirements of the ac-
quis. In this paper it was shown that by the virtue of being in the position of designing their tax
systems afresh, combined with anticipation on acceding the EU, the acceding countries will not meet
to much problems as far as the taxation part of the acquis is concerned. Put differently: in the field of
taxation much of the efforts of meeting the acquis has been combined with transition efforts.
With regard to the VAT, the future members, have opted for ‘EU’-VATs, as a result of which the
indirect tax co-ordination issue in the EU will not really be aggravated. There are a few strings at-
tached however. A VAT, especially if used as a upward funding mechanism as in the EU, and if
accommodated with a clearing-house-system, should be administered exemplarily. Cnossen (1998,
p. 253) throws doubt on the effectiveness of VAT-administration in CEECs. Moreover, the VAT-
rates set by the future members are not excessively high compared to the EU-15, but they diverge
from the relatively low VAT-rate Germany has set (16%), possible leading to considerable VAT-
revenue loss for the acceding countries due to cross-border-shopping.
With company taxation, as well as with the taxation of border-crossing interest, the accession of the
five countries at hand does not diminish the tax co-ordination problem in the EU; on the contrary: it
will make the tax co-ordination issue more complicated than it already is. Although it is obvious that
the current company tax systems in the EU are distortionary, it is not possible to make out a clear
pattern of distortion (even for that the systems are too complicated). With increasing diversity, on-
going pleas for (further) harmonisation in the field of corporate taxation can be endorsed.
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